TLS/SSL - CVE-2016-10213 Subscribe to Security Advisories

Thursday, July 12, 2018
Thursday, July 12, 2018

On June 10, 2016, A10 published a blog post entitled CVE-2016-0270 GCM nonce vulnerability [1] discussing an issue with how certain devices generate the nonce for AES-GCM. With resolution for CVE identifier assignment complications at the time for CVE-2016-0270 [2], this issue was addressed for the following vulnerabilities and as described further in this document.

Item # Vulnerability ID Score Source Score Summary
1 CVE-2016-10213 CVSS 3.0 5.6 Med AES-GCM Nonce Vulnerability [3]


It was determined that the TLS/SSL data-plane in certain A10 ACOS release families were potentially exposed to exploit due to use randomly generated, AES GCM Nonce values.

Affected Releases

The table below indicates releases of ACOS exposed to these vulnerabilities and ACOS releases that address them. ACOS release families not indicated below are unaffected by these vulnerabilities.

Customers using potentially exposed releases can update ACOS to the indicated resolved release or subsequent updates. If the table does not list a corresponding resolved or unaffected release, then no release update is currently available or anticipated.

Releases AffectedReleases Resolved or Unaffected

4.1.0 – 4.1.0-P1


4.0.0 – 4.0.3-P1


2.7.2 – 2.7.2-P7


Workarounds and Mitigations 


Software Updates 

Software updates that address these vulnerabilities are or will be published at the following URL:

Vulnerability Details

The following table shares brief descriptions of the vulnerabilities addressed in this document.

Vulnerability IDVulnerability Description

A10 AX1030 and possibly other devices with software before 2.7.2-P8 uses random GCM nonce generations, which makes it easier for remote attackers to obtain the authentication key and spoof data by leveraging a reused nonce in a session and a "forbidden attack," a similar issue to CVE-2016-0270.


A10 would like to thank Hanno Böck who had discovered issues with how devices generate the nonce for AES-GCM and subsequently published a paper, Nonce-Disrespecting Adversaries: Practical Forgery Attacks on GCM in TLS [4], on the topic.

Modification History 
July 12, 2018

Initial Publication